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The After a brief outline had been given of the various phases of exchange control
through which the Philippine economy has passed during the last twenty-five
)uId years,a detailed description was presented, in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, of both
the trade and payments policies and monetary and fiscal policies followed by
and the country during that period. An attempt was then made, in Chapter 5,to
pine quantify the differential levels of protection that these combined policies af-
forded to various sectors of the economy. In the present chapter, the study is
concluded by analyzing the effects of the different exchange-control methods
'mic andother development policies on the industrial allocation of resources, the




Evidence on changes in the pattern of production within the Philippines is
of consistent with the hypothesis that the differential incentives associated with
the exchange-control and other protective policies pursued by the govern-
fan- ment did contribute to both an acceleration of the industrialization process
during the 1950s and a diversification of manufacturing activities. On the
other hand, the effectiveness of export activities in attracting productive re-
sources, tended to be undermined during this period, thereby inhibiting con-
tinuation of the kind of industrialization program that had been undertaken.
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1961, the shift toward manufacturing and other nonagricultural activities dur-
ing the I 950s should be regarded as the continuation of an established trend
rather than as an entirely new development. Indeed, it seems reasonaNe that
a significant share of the rapid growth in manufacturing during the 1950s was
part of the kind of "catch-up" growth that one would expect in view of the
stagnation and destruction during the wartime years. For example, not only
was gross value added in manfacturing in 1948 still 21 per cent below its pre-
war level, but the population of the country was 20 per cent greater in 1948
than 1939. Nevertheless, the rate of growth of manufacturing between 1948

















As is evident from Table 6-1, which contains Hooley's calculations of
growth rates and the composition of output from the turn of the century to
TABLE 6-1
Gross Value Added in Agriculture, Manufacturing, and









Year Agri. Mfg.Nonagri. Agri. Mfg.Nonagri.Total
1902 55.0 13.0 32.0
1918 60.4 12.3 27.3 5.4 3.8 3.5 4.7
1928 53.7 16.3b 30.Ob 0.7 4.7 2.7 1.9
1938 46.6 21.2 32.2 0.5 4.6 2.7 1.9
1948 49.1 17.5 33.4 0 —2.3 —0.2 —0.5
1961 33.6 28.0 38.4 3.8 10.9 8.1 6.8
SOURCE: Richard W. Hooley, "Long-Term Economic Growth in the Philippines, 1902—
1961," in "Growth of Output in the Philippines" (Papers presented at a conference of the
International Rice Research Institute, Los Baflos, Laguna, December 9—10, 1966; mimeo.).
Hooley's Tables 1 and 3 were used in preparing the data shown.
a. The growth rates refer to the period between the year for which the rate is listed and
the previously listed year.
b. Since for 1928 Hooley does not break down the share of nonagricultural activities in
gross value added into its manufacturing and nonmanufacturing components, the averages in
1918 and 1938 of these components are applied to the 1928 share of all nonagricultural activi-









growth of the 1902—48 period, suggesting that the strong economic incentives
offered to most industrial sectors after World War II contributed to a quicken-
ing of industrial growth.
of What is more evident than the impact of trade and payments policies on
1 to the over-all growth rate in manufacturing is the effect that these policies had
on increasing the degree of diversification in manufacturing. This diversifica-
tion is brought out in Table 6-2, which contains estimates of the distribution
of activities within the manufacturing sector from 1902 to 1970. From 1918
to 1948, the food, beverages, and tobacco sector accounted for between 60
and 65 per cent of all value added in the manufacturing sector. However,
between 1948 and 1956, the share of this sector dropped to 44 per cent,with
such industries as textiles, chemicals, basic metals, machinery, transportation,
and miscellaneous manufactures showing significant increases. From 1956
to 1965, the share of food, beverages, and tobacco declined only moderately,
to 40 per cent, although there were important shifts within the other sectors of
— manufacturing.The machinery and transport equipment industries, for ex-
7 ample, grew from 4.3 per cent of all manufacturing activity in 1956 to 7.6
.9 per cent in 1965. Between 1965 and 1970 the food, beverages, and tobacco
.9 share again dropped significantly, to 34.7 per cent, while the machinery and
.5 transportequipment share rose to 10.4 per cent.
.8 As was pointed out in Chapter 2, the main means of stimulating domestic
9
productionin both new and old manufacturing lines was to protect local in-
the dustries from import competition and thus shift domestic demand away from
ieo.). foreign goods and toward domestically produced substitutes. That import sub-
stitution occurred on a widespread basis, especially between 1948 and 1956,
I and asis evident from Table 6-3. The ratio of imports of all manufacturers to the
ies gross value of manufacturing output fell from 1.13 to 0.55 between 1948 and
1956,and then declined more slowly, reaching 0.42 by 1968. The same sharp
ctivi- decline in imports relative to domestic production during the early 1950s is
seen in the data for a selected list of commodities in Table 6-4.
The government's protection policy was guided throughout the two dee-
dur- ades by the principle that importation of basic necessities consumed by low-
rend income groups and of essential intermediate and producer goods should be
that as liberal as possible, provided they could not be produced domestically ex-
was cept at very high costs. Industries involving relatively simple processing activi-
the ties that gave some promise of being able to produce on a reasonably efficient
only basis were given tax assistance as "new and necessary" industries and were
pre- also aided by very tight import restrictions. Many production lines that could
[948 not be regarded as "new and necessary" even under a very liberal interpreta-
(948 tion of this phrase did, nevertheless, benefit from high levels of protection de-
ring signed to free foreign exchange for imports of essential consumer and producer
.....S
TABLE 6-2
Distribution of Value Added of Philippine Manufacturing







23 Textile products 0.5 0.50.82.63.74.64.7 5.6
24 Footwear and other
wearing apparel 5.93.5 7.86.6 5.13.07.04.3
25 Wood and cork
products 8.0 5.45.39.75.04.04.64.4
26 Furniture and
fixtures 2.3 1.3 1.91.8 1.30.91.40.9
27 Paper and paper
products 0.00.00.00.01.72.3 2.1 2.9
28 Printing and printed
products 4.91.73.63.7 3.13.2 4.1 2.7
29 Leather products 0.70.30.10.00.20.30.30.3
30 Rubber products 0.00.00.00.60.93.22.94.0
31 Chemicals and
chemical products 1.910.96.92.99.910.0 9.1 9.9
32 Products of coal and
petroleum b b c 0 0 0 0 0
33 Nonmetallic mineral
products 3.90.73.32.14.73.74.43.7
34, 35Basic metal and
metallic products 0.90.80.7 1.94.78.06.58.9






































ISIC =InternationalStandard Industrial Classification.
SOURCE:1902—60-—SalvadorC. Umaña, "Growth of Output of Philippine Manufactur-
ing: 1902—1960," in "Growth of Output in the Philippines" (Papers presented at a conference
of the International Rice Research Institute, Los Baflos, Laguna, December 9—10, 1966;
mimeo.); 1965 and 1970—National Economic Council, StatisticalReporter,January—March
1969 and April—June 1971.
a. For 1902—60, 1938 prices; 1965 and 1970 at current prices.
b. Negligible.
c. Included in miscellaneous manufactures.RESOURCE-ALLOCATION EFFECTS 125
goods. To this extent, the effect of the policies was to divert scarce resources
into nonessential uses.
There was comparatively little scope for import substitution in the food
field, since the ratio of imports to production in this industry was already
relatively low in 1948. Moreover, the industry included many essential con-
sumer goods and export products—commodities whose production was not
encouraged by the structure of protection. For example, products of rice and
corn mills were classified as essential consumer goods, whereas coconut oil,
desiccated coconut, and sugar were export products. These four products
alone accounted for more than 75percent of the total output of the food
products sector and nearly 50 per cent of the total value of all manufactures.
Another factor preventing an increase in the relative importance of sugar
production was the U.S. import quota on this item. Thus, it is not surprising
that import substitution was comparatively modest in the food field and that
this sector declined sharply in relative importance as a manufacturing activity
in the country.
For similar reasons, import substitution was slight in the furniture and
fixtures and wood and cork products industries. On the other hand, in fields
such as textiles and leather products, the extent of import substitution between
1948 and 1968 was considerable both because imports were still very impor-
tant in 1948 and because these were relatively simple industries that were
prime candidates for protectionist efforts. Imports were also comparatively
large in 1948 in such areas as chemicals, metal products, machinery, and
transportation equipment. Though the production of many items in these in-
dustries was far too costly for the country to undertake under its import-sub-
stitution goals, there were also many commodities in these sectors that could
be produced under subsidies granted by various protectionist devices without
unduly raising input costs in the industrial sector. These were mainly nones-
sential consumption commodities or simply produced capital goods.
This trend toward the production of nonessential consumer goods is evi-
dent when one examines the detailed manufacturing structure of the country in
1960.' Rapid growth occurred between 1948 and 1960 in such nonessential
industries as the assembly of motor vehicles, electrical household appliances
of various sorts, household radios, phonographs, and television sets, as well
— asthe production of toilet preparations and paper stationery. These are the
kinds of industries that sprang up in response to the very high levels of pro-
ce tection placed on nonessential consumer goods. The Central Bank could, of
course, have blocked the importation of producer goods necessary to establish
ch these industries, but it did not. One indication of the high degree of protection
afforded to almost all the industries in the manufacturing sector is that 80 of
the 102 four-digit products included in the 1960 Census of Manufactures were
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TABLE 6-4




Produc- to Pro-Produc- to Pro-
tionImportsduction tion Importsduction
1948 1954
Cigars and cigarettesP17,061P47,680 2.79P147,384P 3,6000.02
Soap 13,720 4,865 0.35 26,440 4420.02 19.
Electric lights and
fluorescent lamps — 1,099 — 1,385 771 0.56
Coffee, cocoa, and
chocolate prepara-
tions 1,44617,55612.14 7,11710,211 1.43
Cement, portland 9,602 6,150 0.64 17,528 2,587 0.15 196
Wearing apparel 25,04120,837 0.83 38,61812,071 0.31 196
Paper and paper 196
products 75833,73744.57 25,84632,035 1.24 196
Construction materials14,68968,356 4.65 33,80056,164 1.66 196
1953 1956
Rubber tires and tubes — P23,626 — P3,127P20,742 6.63
Trucks P12,594 2,546 0.20 30,308 417 0.01 19t
Autos 1,580 3,289 2.08 15,502 2,543 0.15 —
Steelbars and rods 2,791 6,395 2.29 12,326 3,003 0.24
Ready-mixed paints 2,931 1,863 0.64 16,058 198 0.01 (Itt
Cotton weaving yarns 2,746 9,493 3.46 7,054 90 0.01
Cotton knitted fabrics 10,277 1,499 0.15 24,093 23 0.00
tori
SOURCE: 1948 and 1954—Central BankNewsDigest, June 14, 1955; 1953 and 1956—
Central BankNewsDigest, October 15, 1957. the
out
only with explicit permission of the Central Bank), nonessential consumer cap
goods, or nonessential producer goods. lab
Two other important features of the industrial structure developed in
the 1950s: manufacturing production became both increasingly capital-inten- twe
sive and more dependent on imports of producer goods. The upward trend in ratl1
the capital-labor ratio is evident from the figures in Table 6-5. Between 1950 sur9
and 1959 both the output-capital and output-labor ratios rose. However, the
•1
latter ratio increased considerably faster than the former, with the result that rapiRESOURCE-ALLOCATION EFFECTS 129
TABLE6-5
























































































SOURCE: GeorgeL. Hicks and Geoffrey McNicoIl, Tradeand Growth in the Philippines
(Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1971), p. 68.
Data refer to manufacturing establishments employing five or more persons. Output is
measured in value-added terms at constant prices. Capital consists of fixed assets and inven-
tories and is also measured in constant prices.
the capital-labor ratio rose 74 per cent between these years. After 1959 the
output-labor ratio continued to rise, though much less rapidly, but the output-
capital ratio fell.2 Thus, both of these changes operated to increase the capital-
labor ratio. Since by 1968 the output-capital ratio had declined to its 1950
level, the more than doubling of the capital-labor ratio in manufacturing be-
tween these years can be attributed entirely to the increase in the output-labor
ratio, i.e., to the failure of employment in manufacturing to rise commen-
surately with production.
The capital-intensive nature of many of the industries that expanded most
























4The130RESOURCE-ALLOCATION, GROWTH, AND DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS
unit of value added by industry, shown in Table 6-6. The effect on the average
capital-labor ratio in manufacturing of the shifts in industrial composition that
were associated with the import-substitution efforts in the early 1950s can be
seen if the capital-labor ratios in Table 6-6 are weighted by the value-added
shares of these industries in 1938, 1948, 1956, and 1960. The hypothetical
average capital-labor ratio for the industries increases from P20,763 in 1938
and P21,867 in 1948 to P27,767 in 1956 and P26,456 in 1960. The 21 per
TABLE 6-6
Capital, Labor, and Skill Intensities of Philippine
Manufacturing Industries, 1961
Annual Payroll
Capital Capital per Employeea
per Workerper Unit of (thousands
(pesos) Value Added of pesos)
Food, manufactured 17,581 1.909 2.0
Beverages 18,335 1.293 3.1
Tobacco products 11,926 1.400 1.6
Textiles 26,528 6.223 1.7
Footwear and other wearing apparel 6,560 2.866 1.2
Wood products 20,130 5.487 1.7
Furniture and fixtures 12,460 5.326 1.6
Paper and paper products 36,483 4.531 2.6
Printed materials 14,077 2.678 2.7
Leather and leather products 10,740 2.978 1.7
Rubber products 22,231 1.727 2.8
Chemicals 34,381 2.390 3.3
Petroleum products 314,476 1.983 n.a.
Nonmetallic mineral products 34,828 4.379 2.4
Basic metal products 39,385 4.653 2.6
Fabricated metal products 15,663 2.598 2.5
Machinery except electrical 15,880 2.204 2.7
Electrical machinery 27,818 3.756 2.2
Transport equipment 24,118 3.824 2.9
Misc. manufactures 16,268 3.353 2.7
All industries 21,264 2.782 2.1
SouRcE: Capital per worker and capital per value added from Elsa G. Franco, "Capital
Intensity of Philippine Manufacturing" (M.A. thesis, University of the Philippines, 1967);
annual payroll per worker from Philippine Bureau of Census and Statistics, Annual Survey of
Manufactures, 1960, Table 1, p. 92.





























centincrease between 1948 and 1960 due to the effects of changes in the
composition of the industrialization program still accounts for only a small
part of the actual percentage increase in the capital-labor ratio in manufac-
d turing between 1950 and 1960. Weighting 1960 annual wages in each industry
e1 by the value-added shares of the industries in 1938, 1948, 1956, and 1960
38 indicates that there was no increase in the average human capital-intensity of
er production over this period due to shifts in the composition of production.
p Hypothetical average earnings are P2,020 in 1938, P2,210 in 1948, P2,190 in
1956, and P2,160 in
The increase in the degree of import dependence of the industrial sector
during the 1950s is shown in Table 6-7 by the rise between 1949 and 1960
TABLE 6-7
roil Imported Industrial Inputs Relative to Industrial Value Added,' 1949—64
(1955 prices)
Year



























SOURCE: D. S. Paauw and J. L. Tryon, "Agriculture-Industry Interrelationships in an
Open Dualistic Economy: The Philippines, 1949—1964," in "Growth of Output in the Philip-
pines" (Papers presented at a conference of the International Rice Research Institute, Los
Baflos, Laguna, December 9—10, 1966; mimeo.).
a. Industrial value added equals the sum of value added in the manufacturing, mining,
construction, and transportation sectors.
in the ratios to industrial value added of both imported intermediates and im-
ported investment goods. However, by 1964 the ratio of imported investment
goods to value added had declined to its former level, presumably because of
— theslowdown in the growth of industrial capacity that was associated with the
pital decontrol period.4
These resource shifts during the period of exchange control are con-
of sistent with those that would be predicted on the basis of knowledge of the
protective pattern of the exchange system. The economic subsidies granted on132RESOURCE-ALLOCATION, GROWTH, AND DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS
imports of raw materials and capital goods coupled with the protection given rod
to the final output of previously imported, nonessential goods pulled resources
into capital-using and import-dependent industries. The use of capital-inten- nut
sive methods of production was also thereby encouraged in any given industry. six a
(see
Employment.
In countries with a high rate of population growth, such as the Manr
pines, an especially important economic goal is to create enough new jobs to expo
match the increase in the labor force. Fortunately, although the labor force same
growth rate has averaged 3 per cent between 1956 and 1970, employment has The
increased at the rate of 3.3 per Unemployment, however, has been sig- expo
nificant over this entire period. Between 1956 and 1971 it averaged 7.7 per amok
cent of the labor force in May and 6.8 per cent in October and exhibited no cent,
clear-cut trend. On an urban-rural breakdown (available only since 1965) Minc
the data show a rate of about 9 or 10 per cent in urban areas in contrast to cent
4 to 7 per cent in rural areas. Needless to say, these figures do not begin to tell
the story of the extent of underemployment.6 becat
The various trade, monetary, and fiscal policies designed to increase the eign I
relative importance of the manufacturing sector have not been the most desir-
able ones in terms of increasing employment. The elasticity of employment price
with respect to value added in manufacturing is the lowest of all the produc- only
tive sectors. For example, studies by Mangahas, Meyers, and Barker and by first
Oshima place this elasticity at 0.5 in manufacturing in contrast to 2.5 for
mining, 1.2 for transportation, 1.3 for commerce, 1.1 for services, 0.7 for quot
agriculture, and 1.0 for construction.7 The comparatively low employment- 70,01
creating nature of the industrialization process can also be brought out by and
noting that, although the real stock of capital utilized in manufacturing in- 1960
creased 428 per cent and real output in manufacturing rose 430 per cent be- 800,(





As industrial production in the Philippines has become highly import- as in
dependent, the ability to earn foreign exchange through exporting has become the in
increasingly important for continued growth of the economy. The average an-
nual increase in the volume of exports over the entire 1950—70 period was ucts d
5.5per cent. This can be demarcated into an annual rate of 5.9 per cent from nut
1950 to 1960 and 5.0 per cent between 1960 and 1970. In 19
Although the Philippines is usually thought of as an exporter of primary 54
4 .-,-. . . .RESOURCE-ALLOCATION EFFECTS 133
products, actually six of the ten leading exports as of 1969 were classified as
.irces manufactured products in the Census of Manufactures, namely, sugar, coco-
nut oil, desiccated coconut, canned pineapples, veneer, and plywood. These
istry. six accounted for 36 per cent of total exports in 1949 and 32 per cent in 1970
(see Table 1-3). The other four major export products, accounting for about
50 per cent of the value of exports in both 1949 and 1950, are copra (dried
coconut meal from which coconut oil is extracted), abaca (the source of
hl
Manila hemp), logs and lumber, and copper concentrates. Although the total
b'
export contribution of these four primary products has remained roughly the
S same between 1949 and 1970, there has been a sharp shift within the group.
Of
Thetwo agricultural goods, copra and abaca, constituted 48 per cent of total
I exportvalue in 1949, whereas logs and lumber and copper concentrates
amounted to only 2 per cent. By 1970 copra and abaca had dropped to 9 per
cent, and logs and lumber and copper concentrates had risen to 41 per cent.
965) Minor exports accounted for 24 per cent of all exports in 1949 and 17 per
to cent in 1970.
o tell Exports of sugar have been almost entirely a function of the U.S. quota
because the United States has been an extremely profitable market for for-
e the eign producers. Except for a few short periods, the U.S. price has always been
Jesir- above the world price in postwar years. In early 1970, for example, the U.S.
'ment price for raw sugar was 6.88 cents per pound, whereas the world price was
)duc- only 3.27 cents per pound. A quota of 980,000 short tons (raw value) was
id by first granted to the Philippines in 1934." (Producers in the Virgin Islands,
5 for Cuba, and Puerto Rico, as well as the United States also were allocated
7 for quotas.) This was not changed until 1960, when the quota was increased by
nent- 70,000 short tons. Shortly thereafter, an embargo was placed on Cuban sugar,
ut by and additional imports from other foreign producers were permitted. Between
ig in- 1960 and 1962 the Philippines was able to sell to the United States almost
be- 800,000 tons more than its regular quota. Although the supplementary allo-
cent.8 cations due to the Cuban embargo were gradually reduced, a further 76,000
short tons of sugar imports were allowed each year under the Sugar Act of
1965, bringing the quota to 1,126,000 tons. Subsequently, 47 per cent of any
short-fall in the quota exports of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands was added
to the Philippine import quota. Except for the drought year of 1957 as well
as in 1961 and 1963, the U.S. quota has in effect been filled since 1954, when
the industry first regained its prewar capacity.
an- The other major food export of the Philippines, namely, coconut prod-
i was ucts (mainly in the form of copra, desiccated coconut, copra meal, and coco-
•from nut oil) has declined significantly in relative importance since the early 1950s.
In 1950, for example, the export value of these four products amounted to
54 per cent of the value of all exports; by 1970 this had fallen to 20 per cent.134RESOURCE-ALLOCATION, GROWTH, AND DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS
However, despite this decline in coconut products as a whole, the export share
of coconut oil actually rose from about 4 per cent in 1950 to 9 per cent in
1970. A major reason for this seems to have been the fall in ocean freight rates
for coconut oil due to the introduction of bulk tankers.'° The export share
attributable to copra meal or cake also increased slightly.
The coconut oil and desiccated coconut industries have been helped by
tax preferences in the U.S. market. A study of the effect of preferential treat- wher
ment on the Philippine economy between 1900 and 1940 indicates that the port
degree of processing in the coconut industry as well as in the sugar and abaca in m
industries was increased significantly as a result of the preferences granted by value
the United States.'1 Until 1974, the duty on imports of Philippine coconut equiv
oil into the United States was only 1 cent per pound, whereas the duty on inser
imports from other foreign producers was 3 or 4 cents, depending upon the h
whether or not they were members of GATT.12 Similarly, imports of desiccated prod
coconut from the Philippines are subject to only 60 per cent of the tariff of will b
1.75 cents per pound. In 1974, when U.S.-Philippine preferential arrange- iS
ments ended, coconut oil from the Philippines became subject to the full grow
duty of 4 cents per pound; and desiccated coconut, to the full duty of 1.75
cents per pound. The general view seems to be that the elimination of prefer- Bauti
ential treatment will not significantly affect these two industries,'3 although of th
the responsiveness of output to price changes that are reported below casts the
some doubt on this prediction. copri
Bautista and Encarnación, in a study of export supply equations, have terms
found that relative prices play a significant role in coconut oil exports as well The
as exports of copra and desiccated coconut. Specifically, their export supply
equation for copra is:14
tance
Xc,, =—541.2+ 1.933 Pa,, —1.755Pdc+.8421 Ye,, mark
(2.11) (—2.42) (5.83) abaca
R' =.939;Durbin-Watson statistic (D.W.) =2.40;years covered, 1962—68 1976
where = exports of copra (in thousands of metric tons);= export earnil
price index of copra (1955 = 100);= export price index of desiccated share
coconut (1955 = 100); and = domestic output of coconuts (expressed addec
in units of copra) in thousands of metric tons. The own-price elasticity of ex- equat
port supply for copra is 0.49 at the mean values, while the cross-elasticity for
-
desiccatedcoconut is —0.42. These estimates are used as part of a larger model
to project Philippine exports to The increase in the price of copra is
assumed to be 3 per cent; in the price of dessicated coconut, 5 per cent; and
in the output of coconuts, 3.31 per cent. On that basis, the export supply of
copra is expected to rise at an annual rate of 4.7 per cent between 1972 and where
1976. = expRESOURCE-ALLOCATION EFFECTS 135
share For coconut oil exports, the best equation estimated by these authors is:
nt.in w
rates = —1,393.8 + .8670 + 60.365+ .4126
share (3.68) (3.42)
"(4.61)
R2=.822; D.W.=2.17; years covered, 1962—68
'7
where =exports of coconut oil (in thousands of metric tons);=ex-
portprice index of coconut oil (1955 = 100); W,,annualmoney wage rate
ibaca in manufacturing (in pesos); P,,=implicit price index for manufacturing
b value added (1955 = 100); domesticoutput of coconuts expressed in
equivalent units of copra (in thousands of metric tons). The termis
inserted to reflect the point that the higher the real wages in manufacturing,
the lower will be the derived local demand for use in manufacturing of such
cated products as margarine, cooking oil, and soap. This, in turn, means that exports
jff of will be higher. The export supply elasticity of coconut oil at the mean values
an e- is 0.80. Bautista and Encarnación estimate that exports of coconut oil will
grow at an average annual rate of 10 per cent between 1972 and 1976.16
1 75 In the case of desiccated coconut, which is almost entirely exported,
refer- Bautista and Encarnación postulate that export supply is a function of the size
of the capital stock and the labor force employed in the industry. The size of
the capital stock, in turn, depends upon past prices of desiccated coconut and
copra, since these affect the profitability of investment. Again, these price
have terms are significant in the authors' estimates of the export supply function.
s well The expected average annual increase in the quantity of desiccated coconut
upply between 1972 and 1976 is 6.0 per cent.
Another agricultural product that has declined rapidly in relative impor-
tance as an export is abaca. Synthetic fibers have made heavy inroads into the
market for Manila hemp, and between 1949 and 1970 the export share of
abaca fell from about 12 per cent of total exports to about 1.5 per cent. By
1976 the Encarnación group estimates that abaca exports will di.sappear.
Since the mid-1960s, the largest contributor to the foreign-exchange
• earnings of the Philippines has been logs and lumber. 1n 1970 the export
share of logs and lumber was 23.5 per cent and, if veneer and plywood are
ressed added to the figure, the total rises to nearly 27 per cent. The export supply
tof ex- equation estimated by Bautista and Encarnación for logs and lumber is as
•ty for follows:
model = —861.2+ 16.178 P11 — + .327 l'l
prais (4.05)(—2.55) (1.99)
and
of R2 = .877; s= 429.4;D.W. =.321;years covered, 1950—69
where X12 = supply of logs and lumber (in millions of board feet); P11 and
= export price indices (1955 = 100) for logs and lumber and for plywood,
S136RESOURCE-ALLOCATION,GROWTH, AND DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS
respectively; and Y1 =domesticoutput of logs in millions of board feet. The
own-price elasticity of export supply is 1.33 at the mean values, and the cross- peso
price elasticity is —0.405. The authors found that exports of plywood de-
pended solely on the domestic output of plywood. This, in turn, depended lish I
upon past levels of production and past levels of the export price of plywood expc
relative to logs, rate,
There is considerable concern in the Philippines about the ability of log nitu
exports to continue to serve as the main source of Philippine export growth. with
In addition to the depletion effects of the rapid growth of authorized logging,
commercial forest areas have been reduced at an alarming rate in recent years port
by illegal logging, land clearing, and shifting cultivation.17 A forestry expert appF
from the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization has estimated sorn
that the average annual growth rate of logs and lumber exports during the dec- is ch
ade from 1975 to 1985 will drop from its 10.7 per cent average between 1960 pine
and 1970 to, at best, a growth rate of 1 per cent and, at worst, to an annual will
decline of 15 per cent)8 However, the Encarnación group projects an annual thes
average growth rate of 4.4 per cent for logs and lumber between 1972 and Baut
1976. The wood and lumber industry in the Philippines also is not as pessi- expo
mistic as the UN expert. A trade association representing the industry expects rates
log exports to level off during the 1970s but exports of processed wood prod- peri
ucts to increase. The association's projection is that export earnings for all quot
wood products will rise about 2.5 per cent annually from 1972 to 1980.19 comi
Exports of copper concentrates have also grown very rapidly since 1949. mair
Since this output is entirely exported, the export supply equations fitted by plied
Bautista and Encarnación were similar to those used for desiccated coconut to th
and abaca. The best equation is: port
woul
=—912.4+ .7245 —.1138 SW9+156.7t byti
(2.46) (—2.36) (2.66) of tI
R2 =.934;D.W. =2.90;years covered, 1956—68 thisj
ings
where= export supply (in thousands of metric tons); = sum of ex- the n
port price index of copper concentrates from t (time period) = 0 to t —1;20
SW9= sum of annual money wage rates in mining from t = 0 to t —1;and the
t is a time variable running from 0 in 1956 to 12 in 1968. Copper exports are have
expected by the Encarnación group to decline at an average annual rate of $1 16
3.3 per cent between 1972 and 1976. (in r
The export supply of so-called minor exports, i.e., those not included in desici
the list of the ten principal exports, could best be explained by Bautista and
Encarnación on the basis of an equation which includes total exports lagged sents
one year (an expectations proxy) and the exchange rate. According to this expoiRESOURCE-ALLOCATION EFFECTS 137
The equation, an increase in the exchange rate between the dollar and peso by 1
:ross_ peso increases exports of these commodities by P42.3 million.
de- The various equations fitted by Bautista and Encarnación clearly estab-
•nded lish that the supply of Philippine exports is sensitive to the peso price of these
wood exports and thus, through the relations between these prices and the exchange
rate, to exchange-rate policy.21 A very rough estimate can be made of the mag-
f log nitude of the increase in the value of exports that would have been possible
Dwth. with a peso that was less overvalued. Suppose that in the period 1950 through
'ging 1969, the effective exchange rate applicable to exports was not the actual ex-
port rate but either the rate applicable to essential producer goods or that
xpert applicable to semiessential consumer goods. An equilibrium rate probably was
nated somewhere between these two rates. Also assume for simplicity—although this
dec- is clearly not the case for copra and coconut oil—that the demand for Philip-
1960 pine exports in dollars is perfectly elastic. In this case, export prices in pesos
nnual will change in the same proportion as changes in the exchange rate. With
nnual these assumptions itis possible to estimate from the supply equations of
and Bautista and Encarnación the amount by which the average annual level of
pessi- export earnings in the 1950—69 period under these hypothetical exchange
pects rates exceeds the actual average annual level of export earnings in the same
prod- period. Because of the dependence of sugar exports on the size of the U.S.
or all quota, the two authors did not estimate an export supply function for this
)80.19 commodity.Therefore, it is assumed that exports of sugar would have re-
1949. mained unchanged. It also turns out that applying the supply elasticities im-
ed by plied by the estimates of Bautista and Encarnación for desiccated coconut
conut to the entire 1950—70 period yields negative values for the change in the ex-
port earnings for this product, because of cross-elasticity effects. Clearly, it
would be erroneous to conclude that raising the price of all coconut products
by the same proportion would actually decrease the dollar value of the exports
of this commodity. However, it will be assumed that the supply elasticity of
this product with respect to changes in peso prices is zero. Thus, dollar earn-
ings from exports of desiccated coconut are assumed to remain unchanged at
of ex- the new hypothetical exchange rates.
—1;20 With the effective exchange rate applicable to essential producer goods,
I; and the average annual dollar level of exports from 1950 through 1969 would
rts are have exceeded the actual average annual export level during this period by
ate of $116 million. This increase is composed of the following commodity changes
(in millions of dollars): sugar products, $0; copra, $13.0; coconut oil, $8.2;
led in desiccated coconut, $0; abaca, $21.9; logs and lumber, $39.2; copper con-
:a and centrates, $22.1; and minor exports, $11.4.22 The $116 million figure repre-
sents a 20 per cent increase over the actual average annual value of commodity
o this exports from 1950 to 1969. Alternatively, it may be assumed that peso prices
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increase in proportion to the excess of the effective exchange rate for semi-
essential consumer goods over the effective exchange rate for exports. On
that basis, the average annual level of exports increases from 1950 to 1969 by
$188 million. The increase breaks down as follows (in millions of dollars):
sugar products, $0; copra, $19.8; coconut oil, $12.2; desiccated coconut, $0;
GR' abaca, $32.8; logs and lumber, $59.0; copper concentrates, $33.2; and minor
exports, $31.5. This hypothetical export level is 33 per cent above the aver- The age annual export level from 1950 to 1969. While these estimates must be
taken only as very rough approximations, they do add support to what has
been directly observed about exchange rate changes, namely, that the value of
as a: exports is quite responsive to currency depreciations. However, in both cases, war
about one-third of the increase in export earnings is due to greater exports crisi logs and lumber. In view of the existing depletion of the country's forests, it
OO( might be argued either that the export supply equation used would no longer with
apply if attempts were made to expand log and lumber exports significantly or
that, even if it did, the government should not permit such an increase. Never- and
theless, the rise in export earnings under the two hypothetical exchange rates a
is still substantial without projecting any increase at all in the logs and lumber and
sector. crea
Not only has export growth been retarded by effective exchange rates thro
that discriminated against the export sector, but export expansion has been tioni,
hampered by the import-substitution program, since this has artificially in-
flated the prices of some inputs used by the export sector. Examples where gro
the rise in input prices resulted in negative rates of effective protection in the 13.
export sector were given in the last chapter. A rough estimate of the cost of cent
discouraging the production of processed wood products such as veneer and By 1
plywood by means of discriminatory trade policies has been made by Gerardo
P. Sicat.23 One of his estimates is based on the assumption that the volume of forn
logs and lumber exported was only one-half of the actual amount but that ever
these timber products were first processed into other wood products, for ex- ufac
ample, plywood, before being exported. He found that under this assumption aver
the annual increase in domestic value added would have been about one-third 196
of 1 per cent of gross national product prior to 1962 and 1 per cent of GNP per
thereafter. Not only would this be a significant gain, but it would permit the Froi
timber resources of the Philippines to be depleted at a much less rapid rate. man
Since the Philippines now wishes to promote selective programs both of turii
import substitution and export expansion, it must find ways of eliminating Net
the costs of the former program from the latter. One possible but fairly crude spec
method of achieving this would be to use input-output data to estimate the
increases in input costs caused by protection for a particular product and then












































tion would, of course, require assurance by importing countries against retalia-
tory action on grounds of export subsidization by the Philippines.
GROWTH EFFECTS
There seems no doubt that the Philippine exchange-control system played a
significant part in the industrialization activities of the country during the
early 1950s. As pointed out in Chapter 2, the emergence of exchange controls
as a significant allocating device was related generally to the immediate post-
war consumption boom, but more specifically to the election year exchange
crisis of 1949. By greatly restricting imports of nonessential consumption
goods and nonessential producer goods while adopting a liberal import policy
with respect to intermediate inputs and capital goods, the government's ac-
tions led to high profit rates in many import-competing manufacturing lines
and, as pointed out in the first section of this chapter, thereby brought about
a major shift of resources into the manufacturing sector. Various other fiscal
and monetary policies reinforced this pattern of development, but the scarcity-
creating effects of restricting imports of so-called nonessential manufactures
through exchange controls was the major means of, promoting industrializa-
tion.
From the beginning of the exchange control period, in 1950, until 1956,
growth in the manufacturing sector proceeded at an average annual rate of
13.5 per cent, whereas the rate in the agricultural sector was about 6.4 per
cent. Real net domestic product rose an average of 8,0 per cent per year.
By most standards, all these growth rates would be judged to be highly satis-
factory. Moreover, they were achieved with a ratio of gross domestic capital
formation to GNP that averaged only about 13 per cent. After 1956, how-
ever, growth rates in the Philippine economy slackened, especially in the man-
ufacturing sector. The real growth rate in this sector dropped to an annual
average of 6.3 per cent from 1957 to 1960 and to only 4.0 per cent from
1961 to 1965. Net domestic product rose at an average annual rate of 4.6
per cent from 1957 to 1960 and at a rate of 5.0 per cent from 1961 to 1965.
From 1966 to 1969, growth rates accelerated somewhat, to 5.2 per cent for
manufacturing and 5.6 per cent for net domestic product. In 1970, manufac-
turing growth fell to only 2.0 per cent but increased to 7.4 per cent in 1971.
Net domestic product increased at rates of 4.5 per cent and 3.3 per cent, re-
spectively, in 1970 and 1971.
As many countries have discovered, during the early period of an im-
port-substitution program it is relatively easy to maintain a high growth rate








































factures from foreign to domestic producers. But it becomes increasingly diffi-
cult to maintain growth rates in this sector above those in the rest of the econ-
omy as the ability to capture established market demands narrows and local
manufacturers are forced to enter product lines that are technologically more
complex or are more capital-intensive. Since import-substituting production
relies heavily on imports of raw materials and capital goods, the growth rate
may also be constrained by a shortage of foreign exchange.
The narrowing of import-substitution opportunities for simple consumer
goods appears to have been the most important factor in accounting for the
slowdown in manufacturing growth after the mid-1950s. As is indicated in
Table 6-8, the extent to which consumption demand was diverted from the
TABLE 6-8
Percentage Distribution of Imports, 1949—69
1949 1951—531955—571959—611963—651967_69a
Producer goods 62.7 76.8 81.7 86.1 83.9 87.9
Machinery and .
equipment 9.9 9.1 11.0 19.7 17.4 19.9
Unprocessed raw
materials 1.0 1.6 4.2 10.4 15.4 13.1
Semiprocessed raw
materials 41.6 48.0 51.3 45.8 45.9 50.2
Supplies 10.1 18.0 15.2 10.2 5.1 4.5
Consumer goods 37.3 23.2 18.3 13.9 16.4 12.1
Durable 2.5 1.6 1.3 0.8 1.0 1.1
Nondurable 34.8 21.6 17.0 13.1 15.4 11.1
SouRcE: John H. Power and. Gerardo P. Sicat, The Philippines: Industrialization and
Trade Policies (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 39.
a. First half of 1969 only.
foreign sector to domestic producers was very impressive in the early 1950s.
The share of consumption goods in imports was reduced from 37 per cent in
1949 to 18 per cent for 1955—57. The capital goods share rose somewhat be-
tween these years, but the greatest increase occurred in the intermediate goods
sector. As was already pointed out in the discussion of Table 6-3, the extent
of import substitution in these early years was very significant in many in-
dustries.
The government had no wish to limit industrialization to the easily cap-
tured markets for very simply processed manufactures. It continued to tighten
controls over the importation of those consumer and producer goods thatS GROWTH EFFECTS 141
y diffi- seemed capable of being produced at not "unreasonable" costs within the
econ- Philippines. By 1959, nonessential consumer goods constituted only 1.1 per
I local cent of total imports, and nonessential producer goods, only 3.7 per cent (see
'more Table 2-6), while essential producer goods reached 61.3 per cent.
uction One of the most interesting aspects of Philippine growth, which first be-
h rate comes noticeable during the mid-1950s and continues until the mid-1960s
(see Table 1-5), is the gradual increase in the ratio of gross domestic capital
•sumer formation to gross national product. This was not due to a relative increase
or the in the inflow of foreign funds, but rather to a sharp increase in personal and
'.ted in corporate savings (especially the former). In 195 3—54 these two categories
rn the of savings constituted 80 per cent of total net savings (general government
and net borrowing from abroad making up the rest), whereas in 1958—59
they amounted to 91 per cent of net savings. It is tempting to argue that the
import-substitution program helped to increase domestic savings by creating
veryattractive profit opportunities in manufacturing, thereby encouraging
own-savings. Sicat and Hooley, in a study of investment demand for 200 firms,
found, for example, that profits were by far the major determinant of gross in-
.9 vestment.24 They also concluded that investment in manufacturing displayed a
strong profits-push type of behavior rather than a sales pull.25 However, since
19.9 the investment ratio continued to rise during and after the liberalization period
and there was no significant change in the rate of this increase, it does not
13.1 seem possible to say that the exchange-control system (or the liberalization
program) had any significant effect on the investment ratio. A detailed study
50.2 of savings patterns in the country is very much needed; perhaps after that is
1 made, some relationship between the nature of the exchange-control regime
and savings propensities may be found.
The rise in the ratio of gross domestic capital formation to GNP implies
thatgiven increments in the capital stock of the Philippines resulted in suc-
and cessivelysmaller increments in output, i.e., the incremental capital-output
ratio increased. This trend can be observed from the behavior of the ratio of
the annual volume of gross domestic capital formation to the yearly change in
gross domestic product (GDP). The average yearly level of this ratio during
950s. various subperiods from 1946 to 1971 is as follows: 1946—50, 1.03; 1951—
in 55, 1.62; 1956—60, 3.08; 1961—65, 3.67; 1966—71, 3.8.26 The rise in this fig-
it be- ure after 1955 is especially remarkable and confirms that the system of incen-
tives established by the government increasingly shifted production into highly
xtent capital-using forms after that date. The upward trend also occurred in the
in- manufacturing sector. In this sector the ratio of the change in the real value
of fixed assets to the change in real value added is as follows: 1958, 0.55;
1960, 0.63; 1962, 0.99; 1964, 0.99; 1966 and 1968 (average), 0.85.27
4g
th An important complement to the increased savings response has been
at the emergence of an active entrepreneurial group within the Philippines. As142RESOURCE-ALLOCATION, GROWTH, AND DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS
has been documented by others,28 a vigorous and economically bold group ufactu
quickly moved into manufacturing from such activities as commerce, finance, level
and traditional exports. Thus, in terms of helping to create an entrepreneurial 1970 i
group, the industrialization program was successful, even though this accoin. indust
plishment might have been achieved at lower resource costs.
As noted in discussions of several economic variables, e.g., growth rates
and incremental capital-output ratios, the nature of post-World War II eco-
nomic growth in the Philippines prior to around 1955 or 1956 seems quite
different than after these years. In a study of the sources of economic growth
between 1947 and 1965, Jeffrey Williamson analyzes this difference in some
detail.29 For the 1947—5 5 period he finds that the sources of the average an-
nual aggregate growth rate of 7.3 per cent can be attributed to the following
factors: increase in the labor force, 1.93 per cent; increase in the stock of Meat
land, 0.30 per cent; increase in the capital stock, 0.99 per cent; and technical Beer b
improvements, 4.08 per The average annual growth rate for 1955—65 Alcoh
was only 4.5 per cent and can be broken down as follows: labor, 1.93 per Refrig
cent; land, 0.36 per cent; capital, 1.68 per cent; and technical change, 0.53 Sewini
per cent. The sharp increase in the relative importance of the growth contribu- Radio
tion of canital in the second neriod and the significant decline in the contribu- Soaps
Pipes
lion made by technical change underscore the basic differences in the nature Comp
of growth prior to and after the mid-1950s. Nails
Williamson suggests that the high contribution of technological improve- Cold r
ments in the first period is related to the fact that this period is one of revival Leath
following wartime destruction.3' He notes, however, that in the 1955—65 pe- Wheel
nod increases in the productivity of traditional inputs were unimpressive not Steel
only in comparison with the earlier period, but also in comparison with such Bar rr
countries as Taiwan or Japan. The analysis here seems to indicate that the
rapid growth rate for 1947—55 also was partly due to an initially successful
import-substitution program, that diverted purchases of simple manufactured
goodsfrom abroad to the domestic sector. After the mid-1950s it became
much more difficult to raise growth rates by import substitution. However,
the pattern of protection and subsidization still made investment in capital-
intensive industries and the use of capital-intensive methods in general ap-
Septen
pear to be potentially profitable. Thus, the rate of growth in the capital stock
1
increased,even though the over-all growth rate declined.
Another aspect of the difference in the nature of growth after the mid- receiv
1950s is the creation of excess capacity in manufacturing. Unfortunately, no attem
comprehensive time series on the degree of capacity utilization exists, but the years,
fact that there was little discussion of the problem during the first part of the
1950s suggests that excess capacity did not become a significant problem tectio
until the last part of the decade. In a 1959 questionnaire sent out by the Amer- pro t








































ufacturing firms stated that they were operating below capacity.32 The median
level of capacity utilization was 50percent. That the problem still existed in
1970is indicated in Table 6-9,where capacity utilizationrates are listed for
industries officially declared to be overcrowded.
TABLE 6-9








Meat processing 20% Flour milling 45%
Beer brewing 80 Soft drinks 35
Alcoholic drinks 77 Air conditioners 26
Refrigerators 65 Automotive assembly 17
Sewing machines 15 Electric and gas stoves 24
Radios and phonographs 30 Cement 80
Soaps and detergents 77 Storage batteries 55
Pipes 18 Ammonium sulphate 25
Complex and mixed fertilizers44 Superphosphate 5
Nails 25 Nonintegrated paper. plants75
Cold rolling steel mills 32 Tin plating 35
Leather tanning n.a. Truck assembly 16
Wheeled tractor assembly 28 Cordage n.a.
Steel wires 28 Rubber tires 81
Bar mills 10 Light bulbs 22




SOURCE: UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, "Country Study on the
Philippines"(Paper presented at Asian Conference on Industrialization, Tokyo, Japan,
September8—21, 1970; mimeo.).
Under current government policy, expansion in such industries will not
receive tax exemption privileges. In the 1950s and 1960s, however, no such
attempt to control excess capacity was made. In some instances in those
years,markets for particulardifferentiated products were probably not large
enough to utilize fully an optimum-sized plant. Yet the degree of output pro-
tection and subsidization of inputs was sufficiently high to make production
profitable at low levels of capacity utilization. In a number of cases, producers
were encouraged to expand capacity becauseof thefavorable exchange rate144RESOURCE-ALLOCATION, GROWTH, AND DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS
and liberal exchange allocations for capital goods but were then unable to ships
obtain the necessary foreign exchange with which to purchase imported inter- ess.34
mediate inputs once the additional capacity was In other cases, plus r
the entry of new firms into an industry may have led to a market-sharing, to pur
monopolistic solution in which capacity utilization rates were reduced but indust
prices were kept high enough for most firms to maintain comfortable profit way e
levels. The controls on the supply of foreign exchange for any industry in and
themselves acted to prevent entry of enough new firms to eliminate monopo- 1
listic price and output policies, long 1
In addition to the constraints imposed by the size of domestic markets, needs
another factor that increasingly acted to limit the Philippine growth rate group
after the liberalization episode was the low growth rate of export earnings. mestic
During the first part of the 1950s insufficient foreign exchange with which to who p
purchase producer goods from abroad was not a significant problem. The izatioi
sharp rise in exports at the time of the Korean War boom, in 1950—51, the group
considerable room that then existed for cutting back on nonessential consump- tame
tion goods, the large reserves built up with U.S. aid, and the comparatively a wid
low import-requiring nature of the early industrialization all prevented this. COflS1C
In the last half of the 1950s the problem was still not serious, largely because
the value of exports rose at an average annual rate of about 10 per cent, due used
in part to an increase in export prices. An expansion of foreign borrowing impoi
also helped prevent a foreign-exchange problem. Befor
Even though nonagricultural production had become highly import- oped
dependent by the early 1960s, severe pressures on the supplies of foreign ex- ing ci
change neçded for intermediate and investment goods still continued to be offset
in the first part of the 1960s by the favorable effects of the decontrol program part
on exports. However, with the expansion of manufacturing and infrastructure limiti
activities after this period and the consequent growing overvaluation of the manc
Philippine peso, the constraint imposed on growth by the need to import pro- the s
ducer goods became more and more obvious. The significant rise in imports
that was associated with economic growth after 1966 was not financed by impo
growing exports, but instead by short-term foreign borrowing. When sources of thi
of this type of borrowing became exhausted and exports continued to stagnate, port
the foreign-exchange crisis of 1969—70 brought about a dramatic end to the
expansionary phase and again forced a devaluation in order to generate addi- mncor




A useful way of gaining insights into the pattern of economic development also
in countries such as the Philippines is to analyze the economic interrelation-
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3ble to ships between the agricultural and industrial sectors during the growth proc-
i inter- ess.34 The focus of this analysis is on the manner by which the agricultural sur-
cases plus required both to feed a growing labor force in the industrial sector and
harm' topurchase additional producer goods from abroad is made available to the
ed but industrial sector in exchange for manufactured goods, and then how this two-
nrofit way exchange behaves over time in response to various development policies
in and such basic factors as population growth and technical progress.
The Philippines is fortunate in possessing an agricultural sector that has
long been capable of producing a sizable surplus over and above the basic
arkets needs of the rural population. This rural population is divided into two main
h groups: (1) those who grow food crops (principally rice and corn) for do-
rnings mestic consumption and have a surplus above their own needs and (2) those
to who produce traditional export commodities. Prior to the deliberate industrial-
i. The ization efforts of the postwar period, foreign exchange earned by the latter
1the group provided the economy with its machinery and equipment needs and cer-
tsump- tamessential intermediate products such as mineral fuels and lubricants plus
atively a wide variety of manufactured consumption goods, many of which would be
d this. considered nonessential in terms of basic needs. However, the agricultural
ecause surplus was not entirely used in importing manufactured goods. A portion was
it, due used not only to provide the urban services needed to undertake export and
:owing import activities but also to purchase some domestically manufactured goods.
Before World War H these local manufacturing activities, which had devel-
nport- oped as a result of agricultural growth, mainly involved processing food, mak-
gn ex- ing cigarettes and cigars, and distilling or blending liquor.35
In the early 1950s the government effectively rechanneled a significant
ogram part of the agricultural surplus by introducing exchange controls and greatly
ucture limiting imports of so-called nonessential goods. This turned the market de-
of the mand for these products inward and imposed greater demands on the uses of
t pro- the surplus for importing capital goods and intermediate production inputs.
Iaports There are several potential obstacles to continued growth under these
ed by import-substituting conditions. One of the most important of these is a failure
)urces of the agricultural surplus to grow at a rate sufficient to sustain the high im-
gnate, port requirements of the industrialization process. Producers of traditional
to the export commodities tend to decrease their output levels because of the adverse
addi- income effects brought about by the higher prices for manufactured goods as
well as the increasing extent of currency overvaluation that is used to sub-
sidize the industrialization process. As already pointed out, a failure of this
sort halted the growth efforts of the Marcos administration from 1966 to
1969. The government shaped a development strategy that not only imposed
import demands far above reasonable expectations of export earnings, but
pment also produced repercussions which halted the growth of the surplus.
'[ation- A second form in which a decline of the agricultural surplus may take
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place is through a shortage of basic domestic foodstuffs that causes food prices
to rise. During the period of vigorous Philippine industrialization efforts in
the 1950s, this does not seem to have been a problem. In part, food prices
did not rise significantly because, at least until recently, the country had some
of the features of a land-surplus economy.36 During the 1950s, adequate new
land and technical knowledge were available for the growing rural population
to expand food production sufficiently to prevent any major pressures on food
prices. The wholesale price index for domestically produced agricultural goods
for home consumption (1955 =100)was 111 in 1950 and 110
However, the government also used a part of the surplus for importing basic
foodstuffs, especially rice, in order to assure adequate food supplies for the
194 industrialization efforts. Actually, as previously noted, the period in which
rising food prices threatened the industrialization process through a rise in 1950
money wages and a cut in manufacturers' profits was during the decontrol 1951
period in the early 1960s.
In terms of the effects of relative price changes in products sold versus 1954
products bought, the agricultural sector was penalized during the early period
of industrialization, as is indicated in Table 6-10. Between the periods 1949—
52 and 1956—59, average prices of agricultural products for home
1957
tion fell by 9 per cent, and average export prices of agricultural goods fell 1958
by nearly 6 per cent. On the other hand, between these same periods, do- 1959
mestic prices of imported goods rose nearly 10 per cent, and prices of domes-
1960 tically produced nonagricultural goods remained unchanged.
1961
The liberalization episode from 1960 to 1965 brought a marked improve- 1962
ment in the terms of trade to agricultural producers. Between 1960 and 1965,
prices of agricultural goods for home consumption rose 38 per cent; those 19641
for exports rose 52 per cent. At the same time, prices of imported goods rose 1965
only 24 per cent, and nonagricultural domestic goods, only 18 per cent. The 1966
terms of trade continued to improve somewhat between 1966 and 1969 as the 1967
government's borrowing policy proved able to hold down the prices of im- 1968
ports. The 1970 devaluation temporarily worsened the trading terms for agri- 1969
cultural producers of domestically consumed items, but by 1971 they had 1970
essentially regained their 1969 relative position. Traditional exporters, how- 1971
ever, gained moderately as a result of the peso depreciation. —
Asa consequence of the country's ability throughout most of the indus-
trialization episode to provide foodstuffs to feed the expanding urban popula-
tion without encountering significant increasing real costs in agriculture, it has
been possible to attract labor to the cities without bidding up real wages. In-
deed, one of the remarkable facts about the postwar development period is
that real wages have not improved for the industrial labor force. The behavior
of employment and of money and real wages of industrial workers together by
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SOURCE: Central Bank of the Philippines.
a. All indices are for wholesale prices.
1949 and 1956 labor held its own or, as in the case of unskilled workers, im-
proved its real wage position somewhat. The inflation of 1950—51 reduced
real wages sharply, but the government at this time was much concerned
about the real-income position of lower-income groups. Consequently, special
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TABLE 6-11














































































































































































































































SOURCE: Central Bank of the Philippines, Statistical Bulletin, December 1971.
and liberal foreign-exchange allotments were continued for this category of
commodities after the Korean War period. However, in the last half of the
decade, real wages fell, as they continued to do throughout the decontrol pe-
riod. Near the end of the 1960s, when the country engaged in the experience of
living beyond its means, real wages began to rise, but this upward movement
was sharply reversed with the currency depreciation of 1970.
It should not be concluded from the absence of an increase in real wagesEVALUATION OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 149
that labor has not benefited at all from the country's industrialization. Real
wages in industry have remained about twice37 as high as in agriculture
throughout the entire period, and the transference of labor from agriculture to
industry has thus resulted in an increase in labor's absolute income share. The
share of the labor force employed in agriculture declined from 72 per cent
in 1952 to 57 per cent by 1967.38 Furthermore, within the urban labor force
many have benefited from the relatively greater use of skilled and technical
labor as manufacturing and tertiary services (especially government services)
wt. have expanded.
The major beneficiaries of the government's development policies have
been those who own or control businesses in the industrial sector. Exchange-
8.4 control as well as related import-substitutionolicies created enormous wind-
77 fall gains and profit opportunities in the industrial sector, which were then
20 exploited by a vigorous Philippine entrepreneurial group. In response to the
2.0 incentives devised by the government, a large share of these profits was, of
00
course, plowed back into the economy in the form of additional capital, much
4 of which unfortunately merely added to excess capacity in the economy. Pur-
78 chases of such equipment provided jobs for foreign workers, but the equip-
1:8 ment itself ended up in the Philippines as industrial monuments.
0.7
AN EVALUATION OF PHILIPPINE
5:0 DEVELOPMENT POLICIES
2.8
In judging a country's development performance, four economic criteria are
1.3 relevant. How well did the country succeed in raising its growth rate? To what
extent was the country successful in solving the problems of unemployment
1.4 and underemployment? Did the development effort help to distribute income
5.6 more equitably? Were resources allocated more efficiently because of the de-
).7 velopment programs? When these criteria are applied to the Philippines, it
1.1 would appear that the country does not receive very high marks.
•1.5 The main objective of trade, fiscal, and monetary policies in the 1950s
was to accelerate the rate of industrial growth. As already mentioned, while
it is not easy to separate the type of "catch-up" growth that would be expected
after World War II from development that occurred in response to deliberate
of policies, a reasonable conclusion is that industrial growth was significantly
the accelerated during this decade by the import-substitution policies of the gov-
pe- ernment. However, once the relatively easy type of import substitution was
e of completed, by the latter part of the 1950s, the development rate in the manu-
kent facturing sector as well as in the economy as a whole declined quite sharply.
During the decontrol period from 1960 to 1965 that followed this slowdown,
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lower. Not until the 1966—69 period did these development rates return to Ch.
the level of the late 1950s. But even the growth rates in this period could not
be maintained for long. Thus the question arises as to whether different sorts em
of development policies would have brought about higher rates of growth. cus
One study throwing some light on this subject is the investigation by of
Gonzalo Jurado into the production cost of exchange controls in effc
Using linear programming techniques and comparing actual production levels in
with those that would exist under free trade, Jurado estimated the production the
cost of exchange controls in 1961 to be between 0.18 per cent and 1.65 per con
cent of gross national product. Presumably one would wish to balance the dy- the
namic benefits from import substitution, especially in the early 1950s, against
this static allocation loss, which became relatively more important after the
reduction in growth rates in the latter part of the 1950s. While any assessment Til
of the net balance of these factors can be no more than an educated guess, my OF
viewis that it is not obvious that the government's development policies, as
compared with free trade, increased the growth rate over the entire 1949—71 Pe
period, in
A more relevant assessment, however, would involve a comparison of the liti
government's import-substitution policies with a set of policies designed to mol
stimulate more export growth, particularly in the manufacturing area. In other. cy
words, the government might have tried to adopt at least some of the export- sh
oriented policies of Korea and Taiwan. This does not mean that no import in
substitution should have occurred. Undoubtedly, the government's action of ix'
protecting and subsidizing some industries did help to overcome various mar- in
ket imperfections and correct for various technological externalities in ways th
that improved the dynamic allocation of resources. Yet these policies were an
pushed too far, and it is now difficult politically and economically to dismantle Thi
the inefficient parts of the industrial system. These parts of the industrial sys-
tern also retard potential export growth in manufacturing by being able to oth
bid away scarce resources from this sector. A more selective use of import-
substituting and export-promoting policies might have resulted in faster growth elei
in the past and almost certainly would have set the basis for a higher develop-
ment rate in the future than the inward-looking policy of import substitution. SW!
Fortunately, within recent years more emphasis has been placed on stimulating
exports, though probably not yet enough to establish a firm foundation for thel
future growth.
While one's judgment of the Philippine economy between 1949 and 1971 prd
on the basis of the growth criterion is likely to be uncertain, an assessment of tun
the country's performance according to the other three criteria seems quite an
straightforward. The economy has not done well on the basis of any of these the
criteria. The distortions in resource allocation were examined in detail in wis
— ..
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to Chapter 5 and in the first section of this chapter. The bias produced by the
¶
not trading regimes toward capital-intensive production and thus the low rate of
employment creation associated with the country's growth have also been dis-
wth. cussed in the first section of this chapter. Finally, the failure of the real wages
i by of labor to be any higher currently than at the beginning of the development
effortsand the high profits fostered by import controls have been analyzed
in the preceding section and in the last chapter. Consequently, considering all
:tion the criteria and viewing the 1949—71 period as a whole, it seems necessary to
per conclude that the economic policies pursued by the government did not make
dy- the needed contribution to the solution of the country's problems.
the
nent THE POLITICAL CLIMATE
• my OF DEVELOPMENT
;,as
—71 Perhaps the most serious threat to the use of the economic surplus available
in the Philippines for steady development is its dissipation for short-run po-
the litical purposes. As has been mentioned several times in Chapters 2, 3, and 4,
:1 to monetary and fiscal policies have been closely related to the two-year election
ther cycle. A study of the 1957—68 period by Averich, Denton, and Koehler
tort- showed, for example, that in the five election years in this period, the change
port in government net receipts from the previous year was negative, whereas in
a of six of the nonelection years the change was positive in five years and negative
nar- in one.4° If 1969 is added, another negative change is given for net receipts of
vays the government in an election year. The authors also show that expansionary
vere and contractionary monetary policies are closely related to the election cycle.
nile They further point out that these monetary and fiscal policies produce alter-
sys- nating increases and decreases in the real growth rate of GNP as well as pen-
to odic exchange crises. On the last point they conclude that periodic exchange
ort- crises "at any level of foreign exchange availability are inevitable with the
wth electioneering practices." 41
lop- Although it seems to me that Averich, Denton, and Koehier do not give
ion. sufficient emphasis to the growth goals of the government in accounting for
ting fiscal, monetary, and foreign-exchange developments, there is no doubt that
for the practice of increasing government expenditures and easing monetary
control in an election year has greatly contributed to the nation's economic
971 problems. The 1969 forcign-exchange crisis is a case in point. Only some for-
.t of tunate development such as a sharp rise in export prices could have prevented
uite an eventual exchange crisis, but large increases in government spending and
• the money supply brought about the crisis much sooner than it would other-
in wise have occurred and made it more severe. Now that the country's economy
4.1
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is so dependent on foreign trade for essential imports, a severe exchange crisis Eco
imposes significant hardships on the urban sector. The strikes and riots of of
1970—71 attest to the penalties imposed on labor.
gra
The Philippine economy possesses favorable basic conditions for growth.
Traditional exports coupled with the growing importance of new mineral and in
agriculturalexports should provide adequate foreign-exchange resources for me
sustaining a satisfactory rate of growth. The demonstrated savings and entre-
preneurial ability of the population also should prevent a lack of capital or (ItI
business talent from becoming serious obstacles to satisfactory growth. How-
ever, the main driving forces for sustaining development will have to come foil
from the internal economic interactions among the various sectors. The for-
eign sector can play an important role in facilitating this growth, but the easy
Tar days of import substitution are over. Moreover, trying to force the domestic 197
production of manufactured intermediates and capital goods in the manner
used to achieve local production of simply processed consumer goods is likely 74 I
toprove self-defeating because of the greater import requirements for the
former and the adverse effects on exports. What is needed is a more realistic
Bar
policy of development that does not aim at the establishment of a completely "A
integrated industrial structure in the not-too-distant future, but instead gives Phi
greater emphasis to export production and high employment in light manu- Dis
factures and services in the industrial sector. Yet, no change in development
policies will prevent periodic economic crises unless the government exercises
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iv 1965: The Role of Traditional Inputs, Education and Technical Change" (Institute of
g
Economic Development and Research, School of Economics, University of the Philip-
pines, Discussion Paper 67—8, 1970), found that about one-tenth of the aggregate
01
growth rate can be explained by investment in education.
4. The figures for the decline between 1960 and 1964—from 0.25 to 0.15—are, p
however, suspect. In Table 6-8, for example, it is indicated that the capital-goods share Uni of imports declined only from 19.7 per cent in the 1959—61 period to 17.4 per cent in
the 1963—65 period. Ma 5. Mahar Mangahas, "A Broad View of the Philippine Employment Problem"
[Paper presented at a seminar on Employment Creation Strategies for Southeast AsianNOTES 153
Economies, sponsored by the Southeast Asian Development Advisory Group (SEADAG)
iSiS of the Asia Society, Atlanta, December 7—10, 1972]. The data in the rest of the para-
of graph are from this paper.
6. Ibid., p. 7.
7. From Mahar Mangahas, William H. Meyer, and R. Barker, Labor Absorption
in Philippine Agriculture (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
f
ment, 1972); and Harry T. Oshima, "Labor Absorption in East and Southeast Asia," or MalayanEconomic Review,October 1972, as reported in ibid., p. 9.
Ire- 8. George L. Hicks and Geoffrey McNicoll, Tradeand Growthin the Philippines
or (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), p. 68.
)W- 9.Philippine Sugar Handbook (Manila: Sugar News Press, 1970), pp. 13—14. The
''me following data on the quota system are also from this source.
10. Hicks and McNicoll, Trade and Growth, pp. 194—195. or- 11. Lee Douglas Badgett, "The Response of Processing Activity to Preferential
asy Tariff Reductions: The Philippines Case, 1900 to 1940" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University9
stic 1971), p. 182.
ncr 12. National Economic Council, Four-Year Development Plan, Fiscal-Years 1971—
ely 74 (Manila: Office of the President, 1970),p. 58.
the 13. Ibid., pp. 58—59; also based on conversations with officials of the Development
Bank of the Philippines.
)tlc 14. The following equations are from Romeo M. Bautista and Jose Encarnación, Jr.,
ely "A Foreign Trade Submodel of the Philippine Economy, 1950—1969" (University of the
yes Philippines, School of Economics, Institute of Economic Development and Research,
Discussion Paper 7 1—28, December 1971). The domestic output of coconuts is consid-
ered a predetermined variable in their model. Numbers in parentheses below the regres.
sion coefficients are the corresponding tvalues.Annual data were used for the years
ses covered.
15. Jose Encarnación and others, Econometric Models of the Philippines (Manila:
National Economic Council, 1970), Chap. 6.
16. Loc. cit.
17. See Hicks and McNicoll, Trade and Growth, pp. 211—215, for a more extensive
discussion of this problem.
ere 18. Cited in ibid., p. 215.
19. Philippine Association for Permanent Forests, Inc., Philippine Forestry and
the Wood Industry (Diliman, Quezon City: PERMAFOR, 1972), p. 34.
20. The logic of using the sum of export prices is that output is a function of the
capital stock which in turn is a function of investment in previous years. Investment in
any previous year depends on the price of copper in that year.
21. Encarnación and others, Econometric Models, p. 18.
22. The proportionate increase in the quantity of exports of any commodity is
of given by multiplying the relevant supply elasticity by the proportionate increase in the
peso price of the commodity. Since the dollar price of the commodity is assumed to re-
ate main constant, multiplying this proportionate increase by the average annual dollar ex-
port value of the commodity during the period gives the hypothetical dollar increase in
re exports.
23. Gerardo P. Sicat, Economic Policy and Philippine Development (Quezon City:
in University of Philippines Press, 1972), Chap. 9.
24. Richard W. Hooley and Gerardo P. Sicat, "Investment Demand in Philippine
Manufacturing" (University of the Philippines, School of Economics, Institute of Eco-
nomic Development and Research, Discussion Paper 67-2, 1967).I
154RESOURCE-ALLOCATION,GROWTH, AND DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS
25. Ibid., pp. 47—49.
26. The yearly figures are obtained by dividing the difference in GDP between two
successive years into the volume of gross domestic capital formation in the later year.
The ratios for 1948—49, 1951—52, and 1966—67 are combined with those for one year
later because these ratios were abnormally high. The source of the data, which are in
real terms, is the national accounts of the Philippines as given by the Office of Statistical
Coordination and Standards of the National Economic Council and reported in various
issues of the Statistical Reporter.
27. The ratios refer to changes in the real value of fixed assets and real value added
between the given date and two years prior to the given date. The years 1966 and 1968
are combined because of unusually high and low ratios, i.e., 3.27 and 0.50, respectively.
The source of the data is Philippine Bureau of Census and Statistics, Preliminary Report
on theBCS Annual Survey of Manufactures, 1968(Manila, 1970). The earliest survey
of manufacturing is for 1956.
28. See John I. Carrol, The Filipino Manufacturing Entrepreneur (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1965); and F. H. Golay, The Philippines: Public Policy and NatIonal
EconomicDevelopment (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1961), pp. 408—409.
29. Williamson, "Economic Growth in the Philippines."
30. These figures and the following figures are from ibid., p. 25. Williamson's as-
sumption B data are reported here.
31. Loc. cit., p. 21.
32. As reported in A. V. H. Hartendorp, History of Industry and Trade in the
Philippines; the Magsaysay Administration (Manila: Philippine Education Press, 1961),
pp. 444—445.
33. Ibid., pp. 445—448.
34. For an application of this framework to the Philippines, see Hicks and McNi-
coIl, Trade and Growth.
35. Marvin C. Goodstein, "The Pace and Pattern of Philippine Economic Growth"
(Cornell University, Department of Asian Studies, Data Paper 48, July 1962; mimeo.).
36. See Hicks and McNicoll, Trade and Growth,pp.76—87.
37. Hicks and McNicoll, Trade and Growth, p. 91.
38. Vicente B. Valdepeñas, Jr., The ProtectionandDevelopment of Philippine
Manufacturing (Manila: Ateneo University Press, 1970), p. 14.
39. Gonzalo M. Jurado, "The Production Cost of Exchange Control in the Philip-
pines, 1961" (University of the Philippines, School of Economics, Institute of Economic
Development and Research, Discussion Paper 7 1-16, 1971). Also Jurado, "A Linear
Programming Analysis of the Economic Cost of Exchange Control: The Philippine Case"
(Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1970).
40. H. S. Averich, F. H. Denton, and J. E. Koehler, A Crisis of Ambiguity: Politi-
cal and EconomicDevelopment in thePhilippines, A Report Prepared for the Agency
for International Development (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp., 1970), p. 162.
41. Ibid., p. 170.two
ear.
'ear
in
.ical
Appendixes
ded
968
ely.
port
vey
nell
•nal
as-
the
I'),
Ni-
me
lip-
ear
se"
'iii-
ricy•
,
1
-
-
-
'
1
g